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Summary  findings
Goto analyzes the economic impact of regional  He tests these propositions  against actual data for two
integration on agricultural trade.  Using a simple  incidents of EC expansion:  Greece's admission to the
Krugman-type model with product differentiation, he  European Community in 1981 and that of Spain and
derives two propositions  about regionalism's impact on  Portugal in 1986. The data generally support the theory.
trade flows:  After the theoretical and ex post analysis, Goto applies
* The higher the degree of pre-integration  protection,  the model to examine the possible ex ante impact of the
the greater the impact of regional integration.  APEC free trade agreement on Japanese rice imports, an
*  The lower the degree of product differentiation, the  issue on which (despite heated emotional debates) there
greater  rbe impact  of  regional integration.  have been no major  studies.
Taken together, the two propositions  predict that  It is the popular belief in Japan that when the Japanese
regionalism has more impact on agricultural trade than  rice market is liberalized, Japanese rice production will
on manufacturing, because the initial level of protection  be wiped out. Goto's simulation results suggest that the
is higher and the degree of product differentiation  is  impact of partial liberalization of Japan's  rice market
lower for agricultural products.  would be relatively minor, but total liberalization would
have a profound impact on Japanese rice production.
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iiI. Introduction
Since the late 1980s, we have observed the emergence of a new regionalism in various
parts of the world.  Europe has a long history of regionalism.  Ever since the European Economic
Community (EC) was established in 1958, it has expanded its membership and deepened the
degree of integration.  In 1973, the union of the original six members admitted three former
EFTA members, i.e., Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, as new members.  Greece
joined the EC in 1981, and  Spain and Portugal were admitted in 1986. During these period, the
European integration deepened, too.  In 1968, the EC formed a customs union, and the
controversial common agricultural policy (CAP) was initiated.  The degree of integration in
Europe was further increased in early 1990s when the EC countries tried to form a single market
by lifting various obstacles to the movement of goods and services within the region.  This fairly
successful attempt is known as "EC92." Recently, the European Union admitted Austria,
Finland, and Sweden as new members, and the Union is also moving toward monetary
integration.
In North America, Canada and the United States have a long history of strong economic
ties.  As early as 1965, the two countries signed the Canada-United States Automotive Products
Agreement, which enabled nearly free movement of motor vehicles and parts between the two
countries.  The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) was signed in 1988 and
put into effect the following year. Mexico also wanted to have closer economic ties with the
U.S., and President Salinas of Mexico and President Bush of the U.S. agreed in 1990 that a free
trade agreement between the U.S. and Mexico would substantially benefit the economies of the
two countries.  Since Canada did not want to be left behind, she tried hard to be included into the
1new U.S.-Mexican agreement.  As a result, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was signed in December 1992. After overcoming some opposition in the U.S. Congress,
NAFTA was put into effect in January 1994. Under NAFTA, Canada, Mexico, and the United
States agreed to abolish tariff and nontariff barriers in the region by the year 2009.
In contrast to the development in Europe and North America, there have been few
attempts to form free trade areas in Asia until recently.  While Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand were united into the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, the union started as an anti-communist, political and military
association rather than an economic bloc.  However, in the 1990s, attempts to form economic
unions have become common in Asia, too.  In 1990, Premier Mahathir of Malaysia advocated
that Asian countries, including Japan, form their own economic bloc, such as the East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC), to counter balance possible adverse effects of economic integration
outside of Asia.  This plan did not please the United States or other Asian countries which are
heavily dependent upon their exports.
Another alternative considered by the Southeast Asian nations was to form more open
regional union consisting of broader membership, such as the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC).  The United States supports the formation of a broader regional union that
would include non-Asian countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and notably, the United
States itself.  In fact, as manifested in the Bogor Declaration of 1994, APEC members agreed to
achieve free and open trade and investment in Asia and the Pacific by 2010 for industrialized
countries and by 2020 for developing countries.  In November 1996, the eighteen APEC
members gathered in Manila and presented individual action plans to achieve this goal.
2In view of the increased importance of regionalism in the world economy, the purpose of
this paper is to examine the ex post and ex anti effects of regional integration on international
trade flows. The paper will focus on agricultural trade, because, as shown below, the impact of
regional integration on agricultural trade has often been much stronger than on manufacturing
trade.
In Section II, the salient features of agricultural trade will be examined in comparison
with manufacturing trade.  Generally speaking, intemational flows of agricultural goods are more
heavily protected by tariff and nontariff barriers than those of manufacturing goods. In addition,
we argue that, contrary to popular belief, agricultural trade is far from the flow of homogeneous
products.  While the degree of product differentiation of agricultural goods on the whole is
probably smaller than that of manufacturing goods, some agricultural goods are highly
differentiated, and therefore, any attempt to measure the degree of impact of regional economic
integration under the assumption of homogeneous product seems to be misleading.
In Section III, we develop a simple model for the analysis of the impact of regional
economic integration on agricultural trade flows.  We develop a simple Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman-
type product differentiation model with tariff distortions because it captures more realities of
agricultural trade than a homogeneous product model for various reasons discussed below, and
therefore it gives deeper insights into the likely effect of regional economic integration on
agricultural trade flows. Using the model, we derive two intuitively appealing propositions: (a)
the impact of regional integration is stronger when the degree ofpre-integration protection is
higher; and (b) the impact is stronger when the degree ofproduct differentiation is lower.  Taken
together, these propositions suggest that regional integration has a stronger impact on
3agricultural trade than on manufacturing trade, because, in general, trade barriers on
agricultural products are higher and the degree ofproduct differentiation is lower for
agricultural trade, in comparison with manufacturing goods.
In Section IV, the validity of the two propositions is tested against the actual data, taking
two incidents of the EC expansion as examples, i.e., the admission of Greece in 1981 and of
Spain and Portugal in 1986. We examine whether agricultural trade was more strongly affected
than manufacturing trade after these two incidents of progress toward regional integration in
Europe.  As discussed in detail below, the intra-regional trade in agricultural products
increased sharply after 1981 and 1986, although such a jump cannot be observedfor
manufacturing trade.  Further, a careful examination reveals that trade flows of some agricultural
products were more strongly affected than others, depending on the magnitude of initial trade
barriers and the degree of product differentiation.
In Section V, the model developed in Section III is applied to the examination of a
possible ex ante impact of regional integration. In view of the fact that APEC countries are
actively attempting to realize a free trade regime, we also evaluate the likely impact of future
liberalization of agricultural trade under the framework of the APEC free trade agreement.  One
of the most controversial commodities, rice in the Japanese market, will be used in the
calibration exercise as an example.
Section VI summarizes the major findings of the paper, and proposes an agenda for future
research.
4I1. Salient  Features ofAgricultural  Trade
Before doing ex post and ex ante analysis of the impact of regional economic integration
on trade flows, let us briefly examine the salient features of agricultural trade, in comparison
with manufacturing trade.  As discussed in detail below, generally speaking, agricultural trade is
characterized by two important features: (a) agricultural trade is subject to heavier trade
restrictions (both tariff and nontariff barriers) than manufacturing trade; and (b) agricultural
product is also far from homogeneous, although the degree of differentiation is generally lower
than that of manufacturing trade.
(A) Heavy Protection
As shown in Table 1, trade barriers imposed on manufacturing trade, perhaps with the
exception of textiles and clothing, have been greatly reduced through a series of tariff
negotiations under GATT, and as of 1989, the average tariffs of advanced countries on
manufacturing trade (MFN tariffs) are minimal at 3-6 percent. Tariff rates imposed on
Table 1: Average  MFN Tariffs  on Manufactured  Goods
(percent)
1962  1970  1989
European  Community  11  8  6
France  11  8  6
Germany  11  8  6
Netherlands  11  8  6
United States  12  9  5
Japan  16  12  3
Source: PohI and Sorsa (1992), p. 13.
5agricultural products, however, are much higher. Table 2 lists the post-Uruguay Round tariff
rates by commodity.  Tariff rates on agricultural goods (see "Agriculture, exc. Fish: Estimate 2"
in the table) are 7.6-18.5 percent).  In addition to tariff protection, agricultural goods are also
heavily protected by various nontariff barriers. For example, until very recently, Japan imposed
rable 2:  Binding and Levels of MFN Tariff Rates Before and after the Uruguay Round
(percent)
Levels and changes weighted by imports from:
the world excl. FTA'
Post-UR  Tariff  Post-UR bound
Summary product category  applied rate  reduction 2 rate
Agriculture, excl. fish: estimate 1  25.0  32.4  32.4
Agriculture, excl. fish: estimate 2  7.6  4.5  18.5
Fish and fish products  4.4  4.4  5.2
Petroleum oils  1.7  1.5  3.1
Wood, pulp, paper and furniture  1.2  5.1  2.2
Textiles and clothing  9.8  3.1  12.4
Leather, rubber, footwear  6.4  3.1  7.8
Metals  2.9  4.3  4.1
Chemical & photographic supplies  4.8  5.1  7.3
Transport equipment  6.0  3.3  6.9
Nonelectric machinery  3.7  3.6  5.1
Electric machinery  4.6  4.0  5.7
Mineral prod., prec. stones & metal  1.6  2.8  2.6
Manufactured articles nes.  2.8  4.1  4.1
Industrial goods (lines 5-14)  4.2  3.9  5.7
All merch. trade (lines 2-14)  4.3  3.9  6.5
Notes: 1. Value of imports from partner countries that do not participate in free
trade agreements with the world.
2.  Weighted average tariff reduction measured by dT/ (1 + T) in percent.
3.  Average based on the 40 GATT members.
Source: Finger, Ingco, Reincke (1996).
6an almost total ban on rice imports. In the European Community, most of the agricultural
products are heavily protected by the infamous Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).'  As a
result, the tariff equivalency of such nontariff barriers on agricultural trade is very high.  The
numbers for "Agriculture exc. Fish: Estimate I " in Table 2 show a combined rate of external
barriers (i.e., tariff plus tariff-equivalency of nontariff barriers), of 25.0-32.4 percent.  Further, as
Table 3 shows, external protection rates for certain agricultural product are very high.  The tariff
equivalency is more than 100 percent in some cases.
Table 3: EC Agricultural Protection and Trade Patterns, 1989
(percent)
Tariff-equivalent of
SITC code  protection and subsidies
01  Meat  6-270
02  Dairy products  0-200
03  Fish  0-30
04  Cereals  20-130
05  Vegetables and fruit  0-30
06  Sugar  180
07  Coffee, tea, spices  0-18
08  Animal foodstuffs  0-50
Source: Pohl and Sorsa (1992), p. 22
(B) Some Evidence of Product Differentiation
Contrary to the popular belief that agricultural trade is an international exchange of
There are many detailed discussions of CAP in the literature, including Pohl and Sorsa
(1992), on detailed discussion of CAP.
7homogeneous commodities, there is some evidence that agricultural trade is differentiated.  Note
that under the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, all goods are treated as homogeneous
products (e.g., a car is a car).  However, after many distinguished economists, including Dixit,
Helpman, and, most notably, Krugman, noticed that international trade can be generated by
increasing returns to scale and product differentiation, people came to believe that most
manufacturing goods are more or less differentiated (e.g., a Japanese car is differentiated from an
American car). But, agricultural products have continued to be regarded as homogeneous, and
therefore the assumption has been that consumers only care about its price.
However, there are several reasons to believe that agricultural products are also
differentiated, as discussed in detail below.  While manufacturing products are generally more
strongly differentiated than agricultural products, some agricultural goods (e.g., rice in the
Japanese market) are more differentiated than some manufacturing goods (e.g., cotton yarn).
(i) Apples and oranges as the same product
When we analyze trade statistics, or any statistics for that matter, using available data, we
are observing data which are aggregated at least to some extent.  For the analysis of international
trade, we often use trade flow data classified according to the SITC. Many studies, including the
present paper, rely on the 2-digit or 3-digit SITC data. As discussed in detail below, this kind of
aggregation makes it all the more important to analyze the data under the framework of product
differentiation assumption rather than homogeneous product assumption.
Note that the degree of product differentiation depends on how we define the product.  If
we define the product with sufficient disaggregation, almost any product can be treated as a
8homogeneous product.  To better understand this point, let us take a passenger car, a typical
differentiated product, for example.  Obviously, Ford Escort and Porche are quite differentiated
from each other, and consumers do care about the product differentiation.  Although the price of
the latter is substantially higher than that of the former, some consumers buy the expensive
Porche.  However, if we define a product with sufficient disaggregation as, say, "new 1997 white
2-door Ford Escort LX with automatic transmission, power steering, air conditioning, etc., which
has complete 3-year bumper-to-bumper warranty by Ford Motor Company, and which is
delivered to New Haven, Connecticut on April 10, 1997," then, it can be regarded as an almost
homogeneous product.  In this case, consumers do not care about which particular unit of the
product they are buying, and would buy any unit which is cheaper than other units.
Similar things can be said about agricultural products.  When we look at trade flow data
at the SITC 1-digit, 2-digit, or 3-digit level, as most studies do, we are looking, for example, at
the product of "food and live animals (SITC 1-digit)," "fruits and vegetables (SITC 2-digit)," or
"fresh fruits and fresh or dried nuts (SITC 3-digit)." In other words, in any of the above three
classifications, "apples" and "oranges" fall in the same product category.  It is only when we
define the product at SITC 4-digit level that apples and oranges become different products.  Even
when we disaggregate the product in such detail, a certain variety of apple can command a much
higher price than other apples, because consumers do care which variety of apples they are
buying.  In fact, even at the SITC 5-digit level, long-grain Indica rice is treated as the same
product as short-grain Japonica rice.  The same applies to other agricultural products.
Thus, the popular belief that manufacturing goods are differentiated but agricultural
goods are homogeneous is fairly misleading. Both goods are more or less differentiated. The
9only difference is the degree of differentiation, which varies from product to product and which
depends on the degree of disaggregation when a product is defined.
(ii) Real examples, including rice in Japan
Rice in the Japanese market is a typical example of how differentiated certain agricultural
products can be.  As discussed in detail in Section V below, the Japanese rice market has been
very much closed to foreign rice except for certain emergency imports. Until the Uruguay
Round agreement was put into effect in 1995, Japan imposed an almost total ban on foreign rice,
and even after 1995 foreign rice is imported only up to the minimum access level (4 percent of
domestic consumption in 1995, which is to be gradually increased to 8 percent by the year 2000).
Almost all rice sold in Japan is similar to the short-grain, Japonica-type rice grown in
Japan, and most foreigners, and even many Japanese, will not be able to tell the difference. In
spite of such apparent similarity, however,  rice is generally highly differentiated in the eyes of
Japanese consumers.  At the Japanese rice exchange market, prices are quoted according to brand
and production sites.  Table 4 shows a partial listing of prices of various brands of rice at the
Japanese rice exchange market in 1995. While in the 1960s and 1970s the majority of rice was
distributed through government channels, nongovernmental rice distribution  has become
increasingly popular over time; its  share in total rice distribution in 1995 was 70.2 percent.
Table 4, prepared by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, shows 62 listings (a
partial listing) of brands distributed through nongovernmental channels.  While prices for these
brands are substantially higher than those for  standard governrment  rice (16,392 yen per 60
kilograms), the price varies from one brand to another.  Generally speaking, Koshihikari  brands




Production Site  Brand  in Tokyo  in Osaka
Niigata  Koshihikari  22,087  24,863
Toyama  Koshihikari  22,885  22,772
Ishikawa  Koshihikari  22,748  22,736
Fukui  Koshihikari  22,640
Hyogo  Koshihikari  22,482
Shimane  Koshihikari  22,312
Fukushima  Koshihikari  22,634
Tottori  Koshihikari  22,018
Nagano  Koshihikari  21,905  21,883
Fukuoka  Koshihikari  21.,949
Kumamoto  Koshihikari  21,755
Shiga  Koshihikari  21,680
Mie  Koshihikari  21,718
Ibaragi  Koshihikari  21,808
Okayama  Koshihikari  21,479
Tochigi  Koshihikari  21,705
Kagawa  Koshihikari  21,313
Chiba  Koshihikari  21,640
Gifu  Koshihikari  21,062
Aichi  Koshihikari  21,041
Miyagi  Sasanishiki  21,980  22,157
Akita  Sasanishiki  21,319  21,363
Fukushiima  Sasanishiki  21,273
Yamagata (Shonai)  Sasanishiki  21,208  21,302
Iwate  Sasanishiki  21,168  21,116
Yamagata  Sasanishiki  20,878  20,928
Kumamoto  Hinohikari  20,936
Oita  Hinohikari  20,584
Saga  Hinohikari  20,476
Fukuoka  Hinohikari  20,501
Ibaragi  Kinuhikari  21,550
Shiga  Kinuhikari  20,571
Fukuoka  Kinuhikari  20,400
Iwate  Hitomebore  21,696  21,779
Miyagi  Hitomebore  21,696  21,779
Fukushima  Hitomebore  21,696
Fukushima  Hatsuhoshi  20,765  20,810
Tochigi  Hatsuhoshi  20,608
Chiba  Hatsuhoshi  20,180
11Akita  Akitakomachi  21,741  21,859
Iwate  Akitakomachi  21,025  20,877
Yamagata  Hananomai  20,304  20,394
Fukui  Fukuhikari  20,501
Tottori  Yamahikari  20,558
Yamaguchi  Yamahikari  20,345
Shiga  Nihonbare  20,109
Hyogo  Nihonbare  20,125
Okayama  Asahi  _  21,222
Gifu  Hatsushimo  21,068
Niigata  Yukinosei  20,819  21,031
Ishikawa  Notohikari  21,007
Niigata  Echigowase  20,863  20,804
Aomori  Tsugaruotome  20,357  20,393
Aomori  Mutsukaori  20,371  20,413
Niigata  Niigatawase  20,119  20,150
Niigata  Todorokiwase  19,981  19,946
Yamaguchi  Yamahoushi  19,871
Okayaina  Akebono  19,901
Hokkaido  Kirara-397  19,501  19,652
Aomori  Mutsuhomare  19,059  18,803
Hokkaido  Soraiku-125-Go  18,565  18,797
Haokkaido  Yukihikari  18,588  18,767
Standard  Rice  16,392  16,392
Source:  Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
command the highest price (around 21000-25000 yen per 60kg).  Further, Koshihikari-brand,
rice produced in certain areas command much higher prices than those produced in other areas.
Koshihikari rice produced in Uonuma, a tiny city in Niigata Prefecture, is considered to be the
best of the best.  Table 5 shows the difference in such rices in 1996. As shown in the table,
Koshihikari rice produced in Niigata Prefecture is 55 percent more expensive than standard
government rice, and the price of Uonuma-Koshihikari rice is almost double of that of standard
12Table 5: Price of Japanese Rice, 1996
Price
Brand name  (yen/60kg)  Index (standard=100)
Uonuma Koshihikari  31,779  194
Niigata Koshihikari  25,359  155
Standard Domestic  16,392  100
Source:  Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries.
rice.  Thus, Japanese consumers perceive a high degree of product differentiation in rice and are
willing to pay a huge premium on a certain brand of rice.
The emergency rice import in 1993-94 is another example of how rice is differentiated in
the eyes of the Japanese consumers.  The summer of 1993 in Japan was unusually cool and the
rice harvest that year was only 74 percent of the normal harvest.  To cope with a possible food
shortage, the Japanese government decided to import 2.59 million tons of rice from Australia,
China, Thailand, and the United States. However, Japanese consumers did not like the idea to
purchase foreign rice.  Housewives waited patiently for several hours in line to obtain scarce
domestic rice even though foreign rice was readily available at a cheaper price.  Faced with the
unpopularity of foreign rice, the government sold it as a package with domestic rice.  In other
words, consumers were forced to buy a certain amount of unwanted foreign rice in order to buy
the domestic rice they really wanted.  In spite of such a desperate effort by the government to sell
foreign rice, about 1 million tons (or 38 percent) of the imported rice remained unsold, and the
government was obliged either to ship it back to foreign countries as food aid to the poor under
official development assistance (ODA), or to feed it to animals.
13(iii) Intraindustry trade in agriculture
If the product in question is purely homogeneous,  international trade in the product
should theoretically be one-way trade. As described in a traditional textbook of international
trade theory, for example, Portugal exports wine to England, and England exports cloth to
Portugal in return. However, a brief look at actual trade flow data reveals that agricultural trade,
as well as manufacturing trade, is far from one-way trade.
To examine the magnitude of intraindustry trade, we calculated intraindustry trade
indices, which were  first used by Grubel and Lloyd (1975) for agricultural and manufacturing
trade in Europe.  As in Grubel and Lloyd, the intraindustry trade index of the i-th industry
product (ITI,) is defined as
(1)  I  Ix.-  x  100
X.+M.
where Xi and Mj are the value of exports and the value of imports, respectively, of the  i-th
industry good.  Suppose that good i is a passenger car, and the value of export of passenger cars
from Germany to France is 2 billion ECUs, and the value of import of passenger cars by
Germany from France is 1 billion ECUs.  Then the intraindustry trade index of passenger cars
between France and Germany is calculated as
(2)  ITI=  {  I  - f  } x 100 = 66.7
14If there is no intraindustry trade, or, for example, the United States exports 2 billion dollars worth
of grain to Japan but does not import grain from Japan at all, then the index becomes zero.  On
the other hand, if import values and export values coincide, the index becomes 100. So a higher
ITI value means that the degree of intraindustry trade is higher.
Keeping the above formula in mind, let us look at Table 6, which summarizes
intraindustry trade indices for agricultural trade and manufacturing trade in Europe, which were
calculated by using formula (1).  The indices vary from one combination of countries to another,
but two things are noteworthy. First, intraindustry trade indices of agricultural trade are far from
zero (note that if agricultural goods were completely homogeneous, the indices would all have
become zero).  For example, in the table, the ITI of agricultural products between Great Britain
and Portugal is as high as 97.8, which means exports and imports almost completely overlap.  A
simple ITI average of agricultural trade between these two countries is 76.3.  Second,
intraindustry trade indices of manufacturing products are generally a little higher than those of
agricultural goods. A simple ITI average for manufacturing trade is 86.1, higher than the 76.3 for
agricultural trade.
Taken together, Table 6 suggests that agricultural trade should also be analyzed under the
framework of product differentiation rather than that of homogeneous product, although the
degree of product differentiation of agricultural products is, on average, a little lower than that of
manufacturing goods.
15e 6: Intraindustry Trade Index, 1995
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16III. Regional Integration and Agricultural  Trade -A  Theory
(1) The General Model
In what follows, a simple model will be developed to perform ex post and ex ante
analyses of the impact of regional economic integration on trade flows of agricultural products.
In the model,  the situation of a representative country k (k=1,2,3  ......  Al) is as follows.
Consumers possess the individualistic social utility function (Uk)  in which
(1)  N  1
(  k  =[2Cik]'  ° 
i=1
where C,k is the amount of consumption of the i-th differentiated product in country k, and N is
the number of types of differentiated products available to consumers.  Some of the differentiated
products are domestically produced while others are imported.
Consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint
N
(2)  EPikCik  k '
i=1
where Pik is the domestic price (i.e., tariff-inclusive price) of the i-th differentiated product in
country k, and Yk is the national income of country k.
From the utility maximization, we obtain the inverse demand functions
CI 3 -1 Y




(4)  where  Zk  =  zC
i=k
From (3), the elasticity of demand for the i-th differentiated product (eik)  is
(5)  e  =  1
k  17If we assume, following Krugman (1979) and Dixit and Norman (1980), a large number for N
and the symmetry of each differentiated product, we can neglect the second term of the
denominator on the right-hand side, and (5) reduces to
(5)'  E  =  ___
In equation (5)' we omit the subscript i and k for e because the demand elasticity turns out to be
identical for all products due to the assumptions of symmetry and the large number for N.
The producer of the i-th differentiated product in country k is characterized by the cost
function
M
(6) TC=  Wk F+  WkM  (Y2C.j)
where TCjk and Wk are, respectively, total cost of the i-th producer and wage rate in country k,
and m is the labor input requirement per unit of output, while F is a fixed labor input necessary
for any positive amount of production.  Due to the fixed cost WkF, the production technology
exhibits increasing returns to scale.  The producer maximizes the profit function
M  P  M
(7)  7rik  =  +'t  CY  -[WkF  +  Wkm  (EC.)] 
where ;rz  is the profit of the i-th producer, and t, is the tariff rate imposed by countryj  on the i-th
differentiated product.  When countryj  is the home country, the tariff rate is zero. From the
profit maximization, we obtain the following pricing rule for the i-th producer in country k
facing a demand curve with elasticity 1/(1-l) as
(8)  Wk m (1  + t  )
18Further,  we assume free entry and free exit. Therefore,  the profit of each existing  firm is forced
to zero in equilibrium. Hence,  in equilibrium,  we have
AS  p  M
(9)  ;ik  =  1  C.. - [W, F + W m (EC  A) = O 
Applying  Shepard  lemma  to equation  (6), the demand  for labor input  by the i-th producer  (1,)  is
obtained  as
(10)  I  F  + m  2 C
j=1
The domestic  labor supply  (Lk) is assumed  to be constant,  and in equilibrium  we have
N,
(1)  2I  = Lk
i=1
where  Nk is the number  of firms in country  k.
The tariff revenue  is distributed  to domestic  consumers  in a lump-sum  fashion. Hence,
the national  income  consists  of factor payments  and tariff  revenues  as in
N  t
(12)  wkLk+  I;  i  ikPCi  =1'k
(=  Nk) II  + tik
The above model  is complete,  and the above  specification  gives  equilibrium  conditions
for a representative  country  k. We can solve  the model,  which consists  of M countries,  once the
values of the parameters  (m, F, /3,  tik Lb  M, and N) are identified. Note that this general  model
can accommodate  not only any number  of countries  (M) and commodities  (N) but also the
differences  in country  sizes  Lk and tariff rates (tQ).
(2) Determinants  of the Impact  of Regionalism  on Trade
Let us examine  the impact  of regional  economic  integration  on trade flows,  using the
framework  developed  above. While  we will later use the above  general model  for a simulation
19exercise which accommodates other realities such as quality differences between domestic rice
and imported rice, in this section we will use a little simpler framework to keep the theoretical
analysis manageable.  In this section, the world is assumed to consist of a large number N of
identical countries, of which n countries form an economic bloc while other (N-n) countries are
left out.  Trade within the bloc is subject to no tariffs, while other trade is subject to a constant
tariff t.  Figure 1 shows the basic framework of analysis in this section.  Since all countries are
assumed to be identical, without loss of generality, each country is assumed to produce one unit
of a type of differentiated product. 2
Figure 1: Framework of the Analysis
World  (N countries)




In this simpler model, consumers in the representative country in the economic bloc are
characterized by the individualistic social utility function
(13)  U  = [nCB  +  (N  -n)CR] 
B  BB  RB  '
2 See Goto and Hamada (1996) for a detailed discussion of this point.
20where U,B  is the utility of the representative country in the economic bloc, and CB,, and C,/  are,
respectively,  the amounts of consumption of each type of bloc good and rest of the world
(ROW) good in the representative country in the economic bloc.  Consumers maximize their
utility subject to the budget constraint
(14)  P n CBB + (1  +t)(N-n)C  RB  =  YB
where P is the producer price of the goods produced in a country in the economic bloc, which is
the same as consumer price within the bloc because no tariffs are imposed by the bloc country on
bloc goods.  The producer price of the goods produced in the rest of the world is set to unity as a
numeraire.  Since tariff t is imposed on the ROW good, the consumer price of the ROW good in
the bloc country is (I +t).  Y,n  is the national income of the representative country in the
economic bloc.
Maximizing the utility in equation (13) subject to budget constraint (14), we obtain
(15)  [BB]1-  =  (1  + t)
RB
On the other hand, the consumers of the representative country in the rest of the world are
characterized by the individualistic social utility function
(16) U  [nC  + (N-n  -1I)CO  + c%
(  UR  =  BR  fR  hR
where UR  is the utility of the representative country in the rest of the world, and C/R,  is the
amount of consumption of each type of bloc good in the representative country in the rest of the
world.  Cfl is the imported amount of each type of ROW good, and ChR is the amount of the
21home good consumed in the representative country in the ROW.  Consumers maximize their
utility subject to the budget constraint
(17)  (I+t)PnC  +  (1  +t)(N-n-1)  CM  +  ChR  R
Note that in the representative  ROW country,  bloc goods  as well as imported  ROW goods are
subject to tariff t.
Solving the utility maximization problem in the above, we obtain
(18)  [I_]-f  =p
BR
(19)  [C_]'  P  =  1  +  t
JR
and
(20)  -]I-P  =  P (I  + t)
CBR
Further, from the world market clearing conditions for bloc goods and ROW goods, we
have
(21)  n CBB +  (N-n)C  BR  1
and
(22)  n CRB +  (N-  n -I  ) CR  +  R
Since  the trade has to be balanced  in equilibrium,  we have
(23)  PCBR  CRB
By Walrus's law, one of the above eleven equations is redundant.  So, ten independent
equations determine ten endogenous variables (U, , UR,  , Y,  Y,  CB,  C,  CRI , CB,  C~R  ,  C1,,and
P).
22Now, let us suppose that a country, say, Greece is admitted to the economic bloc (e.g.,
European Community).  Since Greece's pre-accession level of export to the EC is CR, and its
post-accession export level is C,,,,,  we can evaluate the impact of the Greece accession on its
export to the EC by examining the following index of the change in exports (CE), which is
defined as 3
C
(24)  CE  =  B
C
RB
First, let us examine how CE is affected by different values of t.  By repeated
substitution using equations (15), (18)-(23), we can derive the following equation.
(25)  I  1  1  1
n(CRB  n)  PC  (1  +t) -[(N-n  1)+(1 +t)  ]  RB  RB
-1P
+(N-n)(CR  n)  CRB[(N-n -1)+(1  +t)'  ] 
=  I.
Although equation (25) looks very complicated, we can notice the following:
(i) In order for the equation to hold, (CR/I  ' - n) must be positive;
(ii) Left-hand side (LHS) is a monotonically increasing function of t;
(iii) LHS is a monotonically increasing function of CRB;
3  Exactly speaking, this statement may not be entirely correct, because we are neglecting the
impact of the new accession on C,i,.  By assuming that the newly admitted country is small, we
are implicitly assuming that C,¢,  is not changed by the admission. While we add this assumption
in the theoretical analysis here for algebraic simplification, we use a full-fledged model (i.e.,
variable C,i,) in the simulation exercise.
23(iv) Right-hand side (RHS) is constant.
From (i) to (iv), it is clear that if equation (25) is to hold with equality, larger a value of t must be
accompanied by a smaller value of C,R,/  Thus, we proved the following condition:
(26)  a  <RB
at
Similarly, by manipulating the equilibrium conditions, we obtain
(27)  n CBB + (N -n ) CBBC(+t'  = 1
BB  BB  ~~RB
By inspecting equation (27), we can notice the following:
(i) LHS is a monotonically decreasing function of t;
(ii) LHS is a monotonically increasing function of CBB;
(iii) LHS is a monotonically increasing function of C?B;
(iv) RHS is constant.
Hence, from (26), and (i) - (iv), it is clear that if equation (27) to hold with equality, larger values
of t must be accompanied by the larger values of CBB . In other words, we must have the
following condition:
(28)  ac_ 
at
From (26) and (28), it is clear that we have
(29)  aCE  >  O.
at
24Thus, we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1:  The degree of increase in exports from  a newly admitted member to the old
members of trade bloc is largr when the  initial trade barriers were  larger.
In other words, proposition 1 means that, for example, when Greece is admitted to EC (and when
EC tariffs on the goods coming from Greece are lifted), Greek exports of heavily protected
products before integration increase more than those of less protected products.
Second, let us examine the relationship between CE and the degree of product
differentiation, which can be measured by the elasticity of substitution (a).  Since we have
(30)=  l1
in order to examine the magnitude of the impact of degree of product differentiation (a) on CE,
all we have to do is to determine the sign of (8CEaBMa),  because a is a monotonically increasing
function of P for the range of 0<P<1.  Note that higher a value of P means a smaller degree of
product differentiation.
First, manipulating the above equilibrium conditions, we can show
(31)  ap<  .
Inequality (31) means that the price markup of bloc goods over ROW goods is smaller, when the
degree of product differentiation is weaker. From (31) and (15), it is clear that a larger value of ,
must be accompanied by a larger value of (C,,, I CR,B).  Hence, we have
(32)  aCE  0 .
25Thus, we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 2:  The degree of increase in exports from  a newly admitted member to the old
members is larger when the degree of product differentiation is smaller.
In other words, proposition 2 means that when Greece is admitted to EC (and when EC tariffs are
lifted on goods coming from Greece), exports of less-differentiated (i.e., more homogeneous)
products tend to increase more than those of highly differentiated products.
Taken together, the above two propositions imply that the impact of regional integration
on agricultural trade is likely to be stronger than that on manufacturing trade, because the
agricultural trade is heavily protected and because agricultural products are, generally speaking,
less differentiated than manufacturing goods, as discussed in Section II.
IV.  The Impact of EC Expansion  and Trade Flows -An  Ex Post Analysis
(A) Theoretical Predictions
In the last section, we developed a simple framework for the analysis of the impact of
regional integration, and derived two propositions concerning the magnitude of the impact of
regional integration on trade flows.  The two propositions predict that regional integration has
varying degrees of impact on various commodities and/or various countries, depending on two
key parameters, i.e., t (degree of protection) and a (degree of product differentiation).  When
country A and country B are united together, the amount of trade between the two countries
increases, at the expense of trade with outside country C, more rapidly than it would if initial
26trade barriers were bigger and/or if the product in question were less differentiated.  In other
words, when product Xis subject to high tariff and/or when the degree of product differentiation
among types of product X is relatively low, then the trade flows shift more in favor of member
countries.  In such a case, regional integration could be characterized as trade-diverting rather
than trade-creating.
Generally speaking, agricultural products are subject to heavier trade barriers than
manufacturing products (high t), and the former are less differentiated than the latter (large v), as
discussed in Section II.  Therefore, according to the theoretical analysis above, the impact of
regional integration would be more conspicuous for agricultural trade than for manufacturing
trade.  Also, regional integration would have different magnitudes of impact on different
categories of agricultural products, depending on t and orof each product category.
In what follows, we will examine whether the above hypothesis is supported by the actual
change in trade flows after regional integration.  We will examine the change in trade flows,
taking two cases of EC expansion as examples: the accession of Greece to EC in 1981 and the
accession of Spain and Portugal to EC in 1986. We examine the change in trade flows in these
two cases, because they are clear cases of the expansion of a trading bloc, and because sufficient
time has elapsed for the full impact of the regional integration to be revealed. Note that NAFTA
was signed in 1993 but aims to realize free trade by 2009, and that the APEC has just agreed to
achieve a free trade regime by 2010 for developed country and by 2020 for developing countries.
27(B) Agricultural  Trade and Manufacturing Trade
To check the validity of the above theoretical predictions, let us examine whether there is
a substantial increase in agricultural trade between new member(s) and old members of the
economic union after the economic union is expanded.  Since the price and quantities of
commodity trade fluctuate widely every year, I will use the share figures, rather than raw figures,
to eliminate the effect of universal fluctuations. When we look at the data on the change in trade
flows at the two cases of EC expansions, it seems that the above theoretical predictions are
generally supported by the data.
First, let us examine the impact of the accession of Greece to the EC in 1981. Figure 2
plots the EC9's (the origianl eight EC members plus Greece) imports from Greece as a share of
its  total imports for both agricultural products and manufacturing products.  As Figure 2 shows,
until Greece joined the EC in 1981, the Greek share in EC's agricultural imports stayed
consistently around 0.6 percent, with no increasing trend.  However, as soon as Greece was
admitted to EC membership, this share began to increase dramatically, and it was more than
double the pre-accession level by the end of the 1980s. Such a remarkable increase in the share
of intraregional trade cannot be observed for manufacturing trade, however.  In fact, the Greek
share in EC9's manufacturing imports has been declining since the end of the 1970s.
The share of imports from EC9 in total Greek imports shows similar trends.  As depicted
in Figure 3, as soon as Greece was admitted to EC in 1981, the share of EC9's agricultural
products in Greece's total agricultural imports jumped to 56 percent in 1981 from 31 percent in
1980. The share continued to increase, to more than 70 percent in the 1990s. On the other hand,
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_;  mthe EC9's share in total manufacturing imports by Greece has stayed aroundt 60 percent, and
there is no sign of increase.
Second, let us examine the situation when Spain and Portugal joined the EC in 1986.
Figures 4 to 6 show a similar trend.  Figure 4 plots the share of EC I  O's products in total imports
by Spain for both agricultural product and manufacturing product. As the figure shows, while
the share of BC  10's agricultural products in total agricultural imports by Spain was around 20
percent until Spain was admitted to EC in 1986, the share shows a big jump after the accession.
By the end of the 1980s, the share more than doubled to become about 50 percent of Spain's total
agricultural imports.  On the other hand, there is no increasing trend for manufacturing products.
Figure 5 shows very similar trends for the share of EC O's products in Portugal's imports.
However, the share of imports from Spain and Portugal in total imports by EC  10 shows
increasing trends in both agricultural and manufacturing product (see Figure 6), and we can
observe a significant jump in the share of agricultural trade after 1988.
To test somewhat rigorously the above statement based on figures 2 to 6, we performed a
t-test for difference in mean, the result of which is summarized on Table 7.  The procedure of the
t-test was as follows.  First, we calculated the average share over 10 years before the accession
and that after the accession for each case.  Second, I calculated the difference in means for each
case, and ran a t-test for each case to see whether the difference in mean is statistically
significant. As Table 7 shows, the difference in mean for agricultural trade is significant even at
0.1 percent level for all four cases.  In other words, the intraregional intensity of agricultural
trade after integration is higher, with clear statistical significance, than that before integration.
On the other hand, as for manufacturing trade, EC9's manufacturing import (case 1) and
30Figure  4  Figure 5
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EC9's IMPORT FROM GREECE (Case 1)
Value  ($MIS)  Share  (%)
1971-80  1981-90  1971-80  1981-90
Average  Average  Average  Average  Difference  t-statistics
before  after
Agriculture  439.51  2,240.1  0.62728  1.00018  0.3729  5.13836  A
Manufacturing  874.25  3,458.94  0.39025  0.40596  0.01571  0.43097
GREECE'S IMPORT FROM EC9 (Case 2)
Value  ($MIS)  Share  (%)
1971-80  1981-90  1971-80  1981-90
Average  Average  Average  Average  Difference  t-statistics
before  after
Agriculture  251.98  1,486.58  28.0235  63.5014  35.4778  26.0782  A
Manufacturing  2,151.31  4,901.78  59.9696  66.2924  6.32284  3.835  B
ECO'S  IMPORT FROM SPAIN AND PORTUGAL (Case 3)
Value  ($MIS)  Share  (%)
1976-85  1986-95  1976-85  1986-95
Average  Average  Average  Average  Difference  t-statistics
before  after
Agriculture  2,691.47  7,863.8  2.72996  3.51329  0.78333  4.33583  A
Manufacturing  8,005.94  32,637.9  1.89638  3.01757  1.12119  4.63569  A
IMPORT OF SPAIN AND PORTUGAL FROM EC  IO (Case 4)
Value  ($MIS)  Share  (%)
1976-85  1986-95  1976-85  1986-95
Average  Average  Average  Average  Difference  t-statistics
before  after
Agriculture  1,122.49  6,887.01  16.8723  27.5678  10.6955  4.50586  A
Manufacturing  9,108.58  46,442.5  64.2141  64.7192  0.50513  0.7957
Note: A: Significant at 0.1 percent level
B: Significant at 1 percent level
32manufacturing import by Spain and Portugal (case 4) are not significant at all, although it is
significant for case 2 and case 3.
These findings seem to support our general statement that regional economic integration
has a greater impact on agricultural trade than on manufacturing trade, probably because
agricultural goods are subject to higher trade barriers and are less differentiated.
(C) Varying Magnitude of the Impact of Regionalism on Different Agricultural  Products
In the above subsection, we have found that agricultural trade flows are influenced by
regional economic integration more than is manufacturing trade.  The question, then, is whether
regional economic integration has a different degree of impact on different agricultural products?
Figures 7 to 10 address this question. In the figures, the shares of trade between old and new
member(s) of the EC before and after the new members are integrated are plotted.  Although the
magnitude of the impact varies from case to case as well as from commodity to commodity, it
seems that the impact of regional integration on trade flows of meat, cereal, animal feeding stuff,
oil and fat is stronger than it is on fish, fruit and vegetables, beverages and tobacco, etc.
Although the figures on the degree of product differentiation are not available, commodities with
a larger impact seem to be less differentiated than those with a smaller impact. For example, the
degree of product differentiation seems to be smaller for animal feeding stuff, oil and fat, etc.,
while beverages, which include French wine and German beer, appear to be highly differentiated.
33Figure 7
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Needless to say, when the share of trade between old EC members and new EC
member(s) increases, the share of some other countries declines.  In other words, the increase  in
intraregional trade after regional integration occurs at the expense of trade with some other
regions.  To see which countries were adversely affected when old and new EC member(s)
increased trade intensity among themselves, let us examine the change in the share of trade with
non-EC members.  Figures 11 to 15 summarize the result.  Intra-EC trade of agricultural  products
has tended to increase substantially, while the increase in manufacturing products  is not so
obvious.  On the other hand, the agricultural trade with North America (notably with the United
States) declined substantially in all four cases.  This gives some clue as to why the conflict
between the EC and the United States was so severe during agricultural negotiations under  the
Uruguay Round.  In addition to North America, African countries also seem to have been
adversely affected by the increased intensity of the intra-EC trade of agricultural products.
(E) Comparison with Other Regions
Finally, let us compare the increasing tendency toward intraregional trade of agricultural
product in Europe with that in other regions, such as North America and Asia.  Figure 16 shows,
that the share of intraregional trade of agricultural product has been increasing in Europe, as the
EC has expanded its membership and deepened the degree of integration.
However, such a trend does not seem to be universal. As Figure 17 shows, in Asia the
intraregional share of agricultural product has not increased at all.  In North America,as  shown in
Figure 18, although the share of the intraregional trade of agricultural product  shows some
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increase after 1980, the magnitude is much smaller than that in Europe. Note that while
European integration has been making progress both in coverage and in depth for many years
since the establishment of the EC, comparable development toward regional integration has not
been observed in Asia and North America until very recently. Probably time is needed before
any such progress can be identified in these regions.
V. Regional  Integration  and Japanese Rice Imports  - An  Ex Anti Analysis
In this section, we will conduct an ex ante analysis of the effect of regional economic
integration on agricultural trade flows.  Using the framework developed in Section III, we will
43examine the impact of APEC-wide free trade agreement on rice imports by Japan, one of the
most heatedly debated issues in that country in recent years.  The Japanese people are very
sensitive to imported rice, and due to the almost total control by the government, the price of rice
in Japan is about six times higher than the price on the international market.  Because of the huge
gap between the price of Japanese rice and the international price, many people in Japan fear that
opening up  the Japanese rice market would almost wipe out rice production in Japan.  The
Japanese government adamantly resisted the pressure for liberalization during the Uruguay
Round negotiation, and did not accept the tariffication of imports of foreign rice into Japan.
Instead, Japan only promised a minimum opening to foreign rice of four percent of domestic
consumption (379 thousand tons) in 1995, which will gradually increase to eight percent (758
thousand tons) by the year 2000.
In addition to global liberalization under the Uruguay Round, Japanese rice producers
face another challenge.  In 1994, leaders of the APEC countries agreed that in order to achieve
free trade in the region, developed and developing countries in the APEC area will implement
the free trade by 2010 and 2020, respectively. This might cause a serious threat to Japanese rice
producers because the share of APEC production in total world rice production is more than 50
percent and APEC includes major rice exporters such as Thailand, the United States, China, and
Australia.
Thus, it is feared that if Japan accepts free import (or even preferential import) of rice
from APEC countries, the liberalization will have a profound impact on the Japanese rice market.
In spite of the importance of the issue, there are few, if any, formal studies that examine the
likely impact of an APEC free trade arrangement on the Japanese rice market, and therefore the
44argument on the issues is often emotional. The following simulation is intended to fill the gap to
some extent, even though the estimation is preliminary and depends on various simplifying
assumptions.
(A) Rice Market in Japan
Before going to the simulation exercise, let us briefly discuss the salient features of the
rice market in Japan.
Until November 19954,  the production, distribution, and pricing of rice were totally
controlled by the government under the Food Control Act of 1942, which had been enacted to
cope with the severe food shortage during World War II.  Under that law, the government
announced the estimated total rice consumption in Japan every year. In order to satisfy the
estimated demand, the government decided on the amount of rice to purchase from each local
unit, which in turn decided how much to purchase from each farmer.  Since farmers had an
obligation to sell rice to the government, the planned purchase amount constituted the limit on
rice production.  The purchasing price from farmers and selling price to consumers was also
decided by the government every year.  Until the new law was enacted in 1995, only licenced
wholesalers and retailers were allowed to handle the distribution of rice (i.e., it was illegal for
regular supermarkets to sell rice).
'  In November 1995, the new Food Law was put into effect.  Although the new law was
intended to deregulate the Japanese rice market, imported rice is still almost totally controlled by
the government.
45Although the initial purpose of the Food Control Act of 1942 was to protect consumers
from severe food shortage during the war, it gradually changed into an income support program
for farmers As urban workers achieved double-digit annual wage increases during the high
economic growth of the 1960s, the Basic Agriculture Act was enacted in 1961, with the major
purpose of narrowing the income gap between the rural and urban sectors.  As a result, rice prices
were raised rapidly to provide farmers with an income equivalent to that of urban workers.  In
early 1960s, the price of the Japanese rice (25 cents per kilogram) was not very different from the
price on the international market (19 cents per kilogram), but by the end of the 1980s the former
(1.98 dollars) had become more than six times higher than the latter (30 cents).
Obviously, the rapid increase in the domestic price of rice encouraged production and
discouraged consumption.  As a result, the stockpile of rice in Japan grew dramatically in the
late 1960s. Figure 19 shows the actual and potential production level and the amount of the
stockpile of rice in Japan since 1960. As shown in the figure, in the late 1960s the amount of
unsold rice in Japan exceeded 7 million metric tons, which was more than half the annual
production.  Faced with this huge stockpile, the government began exporting rice (at the much
cheaper international price) or gave it away as official development assistance.  In addition, in
order to cope with the long-term overproduction, the government initiated production controls in
1971. By various measures, such as subsidy and punishment, the planned production control has
been strictly enforced.  As a result, the actual amount of production has almost always been the
same as the planned amount.  As Figure 19 shows, the difference between potential and actual
production since 1980 has been around 30 percent of actual production. In short, through strict
46Figure  ig
RICE  PRODUCTION  IN  JAPAN,  1960-1995
14  00  ....
200  -~~~~~~~~~~i
0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rdc
FISCAl. YEAR~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Cot  a
Sor1  2n  ie  rmsttsi0o  teJpnseMnsr0f  giutr  adPsel
goenmn  coto,tehghpieo  h  Jpns  iehs  enmitiedadpouto
controls  hae  beenstrictly  enforced to avi  oveproucton
As  metind  th  begining  o  tis  eto,rcnl  h  aaeerc  akthsbe
avoided  tariffication  II  ofrric,  the  opposi.tio.b  farmners  to  .the  Abiclishment.  oFithe nofoeinic
poiy As  mentormous Sinhe suchinopning  u  of thiseto,rcnlthJanse rice market  isepetdaosedt  aee
lowernpiceI forpric(ande  wthefoet  the  decline iond  fagremers'  incoes)  thvengovernments  ablsogin  the
gie  pth  plcyo  "o  igl  iee  ffoegnrieinJpa,  ndi  195i  iprtd479,0same Diet session that ratified the Uruguay Round agreement, appropriated more than 6 trillion
yen (about 60 billion U.S. dollars) to increase farmers' incomes.  This 6 trillion yen is not for a
direct cash payment to the farmers; it is intended to increase farmers' income indirectly through
various measures including improving the infrastructure in rural areas, enhancing agricultural
technology, making loans available to farmers, etc.
Under the new Food Law, the government gave up total control of rice distribution, and
rice distributed outside of government control was legalized.  However, the import of rice is still
under almost total control of the government.  With a minor exception called the SBS
(simultaneous buy and sell) formula 5, only the government can import foreign rice.  When the
government buys foreign rice, it is allowed to impose a surcharge of up to 292 yen per kilogram
of imported rice when the government sells it in the Japanese market.  Since the surcharge of 292
yen per kilogram is equivalent to a 779 percent surcharge, the government can, in effect, raise the
price of foreign rice sold in Japan as much as it wishes. Note that when the full 292 yen
surcharge is imposed, the price of foreign rice becomes 2.64 dollars per kilogram, which is even
higher than the current price of domestic rice (1.98 dollars per kilogram).  Thus, even under the
Uruguay Round agreement and the new Food Law, the government can set the price of
government-distributed rice, both domestic and foreign, at whatever level it wishes.
5 Under the SBS formula, the importer and wholesaler file a joint application to the
government, in which they have to specify the buying price of the importer from the foreign
producer and the selling price of the importer to the domestic wholesaler.  The government
allocates the import quota to the application with the biggest gap between the buying price and
selling price, and the difference goes to the government.  SBS imports are limited to about ten
percent of total rice imports in Japan.
48(B) APEC  and Japanese Rice -- An Illustrative Simulation
(i) Basic Simulation  Strategy
Now, let us examine the impact on the Japanese rice market when the government gives
up control of the quantity of rice imports. In this hypothetical case, the government controls the
price of foreign rice in the Japanese market only through tariffs, while it can still control the price
of domestically produced rice.  The simulation is conducted using the product differentiation
model developed in Section III, in view of the fact that rice is a fairly differentiated product in
Japan, as discussed in Section II.  More specifically, the following maximization problem is
solved to examine the impact of the APEC free trade agreement on the Japanese market, which is
the adapted version of equations (1) and (2) in Section III. In other words, the objective function
of the utility maximization problem of the Japanese consumers is
(33)  o<  i U  =  [nd q  Cd  +  na Ca  + nr  Col ]  <  O  1  <  I 
where Cd , C,,, and Cr  are the consumption of each type of domestically produced rice, rice
produced in APEC countries, and rice produced in the rest of the world, respectively. Note that
Ca,  and Cr  are also the amounts of import of each type of rice from APEC and from the rest of the
world.  Also note that n,d, n,, and nr are the number of types of domestically produced rice, rice
imported from APEC countries, and rice imported from the rest of the world, respectively.  U is
the utility of the Japanese consumers, and q is the quality premium index of domestically
produced rice, which is discussed in detail below.
Japanese consumers maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint
(34)  P dn  Cd  + P  (I+t)n,  C  +  Pr  (l+tr)fnrCr  =  Y,
49where P,d, Pa, and Pr are the price of each type of domestically produced rice, rice imported from
APEC country, and rice imported from the rest of the world, respectively.  In the equation  ta,  and
t, are the tariff rate imposed on the import of rice from APEC and the rest of the world,
respectively, and Y  is the amount of income available to spend on rice purchase.
When we identify the parameters n,  na, nr q, Pd P,,,  P,,  Y, ta and t,  we can solve the
model for the welfare maximizing amount of consumption of each type of rice (Cd, Ce, and CQ).
Then, to examine the magnitude of the impact of the APEC free trade agreement on the Japanese
rice market, all we have to do is obtain, by simulation, the values of C,* C", and C, for reduced
values of t,,, and compare them with corresponding values with no tariff concessions.  Needless
to say, when the rice imports from APEC countries are totally liberalized, ta becomes zero. 6
(ii) Identification  of Parameter  Values
Using data from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), we obtained P,,-0.38 (dollar
price per kilogram of rice) and P,=0.38.  For the price of the domestic rice, we adjusted the price
of domestic rice in the year 2000 by taking into consideration the recent slight decline in buying
price by the government, and we obtained Pd= 1 .92. In other words, the producer price of
domestic rice is five times higher than foreign rice even in the year 2000.  Using statistics from
the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery, we obtained a total buying price for domestic
rice of Y=19,479  (million dollars).  While actual data are available for Pd, Pa, P,, and Y,  other
6 Since total liberalization of such a sensitive agricultural product in Japan is unlikely, the
effects of various levels of tariff reductions, as well as the case of zero tariff, are simulated
below.
50parameters have to be calculated indirectly. For example, nd is obtained by dividing the amount
of total production of rice in Japan by the number of brands of rice listed in the Annual White
Paper of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery 7, i.e., n,=21, and n, (nr) is obtained by dividing
the amount of total exports of rice from APEC countries by the average amount of production of
domestic rice.
In view of the fact that the capacity to export is constrained by the need to feed its own
population, we assumed that the amount of rice which could potentially be brought into the
Japanese market was limited to the amount already in the international market in 1990-95.
Therefore, the calculation of n, and n, was based on the amount of exports rather than on the
amount of total production, and we obtained naf19 and nr=17.
TIhe  value of q (quality premium index of domestic rice over foreign rice) was the most
difficult to identify.  To obtain this figure we used FAO statistics to calculate the price of rice
imported by Japan (56.8 cents per kilogram) and the price of rice imported by Asian developing
countries (36.3 cents per kilogram) in 1994, when Japan imported a fairly large amount of rice in
order to cope with a possible shortage due to its poor harvest.  Thus, the price of rice brought into
Japan is 56.5 percent higher than average in the (undistorted) international market.  In addition,
we tried to incroporate the unpopularity of foreign rice even at the substantially cheaper prices
during emergency import in 1994 (due to inferior quality because of foreign objects like stone
7 The brands of rice below the cut-off point in production (15,000 ha) are omitted from the
calculation.
51chips, lack of stickiness, etc.); and, somewhat arbitrarily,we squared the price difference  in 1994
to obtain q8.
(35)  ~56.8  2 (3  5)  q  =  I5-8  = 2.45
36.3
For the value of  ,  we used 0.6, which was used in Goto and Hamada (1996); they in turn  based
their figure on the estimate by R. Stem, J. Francis, and B. Schumacher (1976).  Since P=0.6 is
not a decisive number, we conducted sensitivity analysis using different values of 0, as reported
in the appendix.  A brief look at Table 20 and two appendix tables reveals that the thrust of the
argument in the next subsection is quite insensitive to variations of P3.
We calculated t,, and tr as the tariff rates which keep the import of rice at the agreed
minimal access level (758,000 metric tons) in 2000, and obtained t, 1 (t4)=5.80. In other words, to
keep the amount of foreign rice at the minimum access level (8 percent of domestic
consumption), Japan has to impose a 580 percent tariff on foreign rice.
(iii) Result of Simulation
Now that we have equations for optimization problem and all the parameter values
needed, we can simulate how the trade liberalization under the APEC agreement affects the rice
market in Japan.  Let us look at the upper panel of Figure 20, which summarizes the simulation
'Incidentally,  in March 1997, the author checked the retail price of different brands of rice at
supermarkets in the Washington metropolitan area, and found that "Califomia Rose Rice," which
is similar to Japanese rice, was 4.49 dollars per 5 pounds, while the price of standard rice was
1.99 dollars per 5 pounds.  Thus, even in the United States, where protection on rice is minimal,
Japanese-like rice can command a much higher price than standard rice, probably because of the
quality difference.  The price ratio of California Rose Rice to standard rice in Washington was
2.26 (= 4.49/1.99), which is more or less similar to the above estimate for q (=2.45).
52Figure 20
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53results.  Horizontal axis plots the degree of trade liberalization under the APEC free trade
agreement.  "Minimum" means the tariff rate to keep foreign rice at the minimum access level
(758,000 metric tons).  In order to keep foreign rice at this level, the government has to impose
580 percent tariff on imported rice.  "10%," "20%," .... means the situation where the initial tariff
(580 percent) imposed on APEC rice is reduced by "10%," "20%," and so forth.  When the initial
tariff on APEC rice is reduced by 10 percent (20 percent), the new tariff rate becomes 522
percent (464 percent), and so forth.  "ALL FREE" means the situation where tariffs imposed on
foreign rice, both APEC and non-APEC rice, are totally abolished.
Keeping the above in mind, let us examine the simulation result.  Contrary to the popular
argument in Japan, the impact of preferential liberalization of APEC rice is not so large, although
the completely free import of APEC rice has a big impact. As the figure shows, even if the
minimum access tariff level (580 percent) is halved (290 percent), the share of imported rice
increased by 10.4 percent to become 18.4 percent, although if total liberalization of the import of
APEC rice is realized, the share of imported rice becomes as high as 84.8 percent.  If the tariff
reduction to APEC rice remains 10-30 percent, the impact on the domestically produced rice is
minimal.  For example, when tariff on APEC rice is reduced by 20 percent, the share of foreign
rice in the Japanese market increases only by 2.3 percent to become 10.3 percent.  Thus, the
simulation result reported here, which is based on the product differentiation framework rather
than the homogeneous product assumption, suggests that the impact of partial liberalization of
rice imports from APEC countries is too small to wipe out the Japanese agriculture.
Further, note that the simulation result in the upper panel of Figure 20 is based on the
assumption that the current high price of domestic rice is maintained without major change.
However, since the mid-1990s, when the Japanese government gave up the policy of "no single
54piece of foreign rice," support for the idea of maintaining farmers' income through excessively
high prices seems to be fading a little.  If the Japanese government can reduce the support price
of domestically produced rice, the impact of a tariff reduction on APEC rice becomes smaller.
The lower panel of Figure 20 shows the simulation result when the support price is halved from
the benchmark price level used for the simulation in the upper panel.  If the government succeeds
in reducing the price of domestic rice by half, the tariff necessary to keep imported rice to the
minimum access level is 240 percent.  In this case, the impact of a 10-30 percent reduction of
tariffs on APEC rice is minimal.  Even when the tariff rate on APEC rice is reduced by 50
percent, the share of imported rice increases by a mere 7.1 percent to 15.1 percent.  However, if
the tariff on APEC rice is totally abolished, the market share of domestic producers is reduced to
50 percent.
Thus, according to the simulation result reported here, which incorporates product
differentiation, the impact on Japan of partial liberalization of the rice market seems to be much
smaller than feared. 9
VI. Concluding Remarks
By using a simple trade model with product differentiation, we have analyzed the impact
of regional economic integration on agricultural trade, comparing it with the impact on
manufacturing trade.  Using the model developed in the paper, we hav6 found that the degree of
impact of the free trade agreement on trade flows depends on two key parameters: degree of
9  Appendices 1 and 2 suggest that the above result is rather insensitive to the different values
of p.
55initialprotection  (t) and degree ofproduct  differentiation (a).  The impact of the expansion of
the FTA on agricultural trade flows tends to be larger than that on manufacturing trade because
the initial protection level on agricultural trade is larger and because, generally speaking,
agricultural goods are less differentiated than manufacturing goods.
Examining the data on the change in trade flows for two incidents of EC expansion, we
have confinned, at least to some extent, the validity of the theoretical prediction.  When EC
expanded, agricultural trade between the new member(s) and old members increased
dramatically, while no comparable jumps were observed for the manufacturing trade.  Further,
among agricultural goods, the impact on certain products with less product differentiation, such
as meat, animal feeding stuff, and fat, was stronger than the impact on more differentiated
products such as fruits and vegetables and beverages.
After the ex post analysis, the model is applied to an ex ante analysis of the impact of the
APEC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on one of the most controversial commodities, rice in the-
Japanese market.  Many people in Japan are arguing that if their rice market is opened up to
foreign rice, Japanese rice production will be wiped out.  In spite of this emotional argument,
there have been very few, if any, objective studies on the impact of liberalization on the Japanese
rice market.  In view of this, one purpose of this study is to fill the gap by presenting an objective
simulation result.  The simulation result in this paper suggests that the impact will not be as large
as many peopel fear.
It seems that the fear of liberalization emphasizes only one of the two parameters
mentioned above; i.e., degree of intial protection. Of course, the impact of the APEC FTA on the
Japanese rice market tends to be large because the current protection level on rice in Japan is
56very high (the tariff equivalency of the protection on rice is more than 500 percent).  However, it
should be noted that in the Japanese market rice is a highly differentiated product, and consumers
are willing to pay a high premium on certain brands of rice. As examined in the theoretical part
of the paper, such a high degree of product differentiation tends to reduce the impact of the FTA
on the domestic market.  Thus, two conflicting forces determine the impact of the APEC FTA on
Japanese rice imports.  According to the simulation result, the overall impact of the partial
liberalization is rather small, although the complete FTA has a profound impact on Japanese rice
producers.
As mentioned above, the simulation result is still at a preliminary stage because it
depends on various simplifying assumptions, such as the lack of adjustment by producers.
Although we assumed in the simulation exercise that the quality of the Japanese rice is better
than that of the imported rice, it is possible that foreign producers, could, in the long run, shift
their production from current low-quality rice to high-quality, Japanese-like rice for export to the
Japanese market.  If that happens, the impact of the APEC FTA would become larger than the
simulation result suggests.  On the other hand, while the simulation result assumes that the
current inefficiency in Japanese production continues, external pressure after the Uruguay Round
will certainly push Japanese farmers to adopt larger-scale, more efficient production technology.
If this happens, the impact of the APEC FTA on rice imports to Japan would be lessened by the
strengthened competitiveness of the Japanese rice producers.
For all its imperfections, we hope that the present study is of some use in the objective
discussion of agricultural trade policies in Japan and other countries.
57Appendix 1
Impact of APEC FTA on the Japanese Rice Market
(Low  f  Case)
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58Appendix 2
Impact of APEC FTA on the Japanese Rice Market
(High  ,  Case)
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